I
don’t know as much about Robert McNamara as I should. I do know he was the Lyndon Johnson adviser
who was responsible for the escalation of American military involvement in
Vietnam. His recent death brings David
Brooks and Gail Collins, on their New York Times blog, “The Conversation,” to
discuss a question the caption writer words as, “Has our ruling class gotten
better or worse over the ages?”
Brooks
starts off. He compares the bureaucratic
elite of the 1950s to the elite of the 1960s (McNamara’s time), and presents
McNamara’s failings as of a piece with what he as a conservative considers the
decline of America generally over those two decades. He presents a narrative in which the “wise
men” of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were great men, innovators,
responsible for creating the institutions that made the America of the second
half of the twentieth century what it was.
The corresponding “best and brightest” of the succeeding decade,
however, were entirely different. In
their hands, everything fell apart.
In
case you were wondering why, Brooks offers up a handful of possibilities: the
kind of education they were given, their belief that they were in possession of
scientific knowledge that could tell them exactly how to govern, their belief
in their own competence, and their belief that they could improve conditions
for other people at home and around the world.
Basically, they were Democrats.
The men of the 1950s, on the other hand, were wealthy industrialists
(and the sons of industrialists), plutocrats with Wall Street values who
believed their wealth and opportunities gave them the responsibility and the
competence to participate in government.
In other words, Republicans (though probably Rockefeller Republicans, as
they’d later be called, not necessarily conservatives).
Undeniably,
something happened sometime between 1958 and 1974. The difference between the bureaucrats of the
immediate post-war period and those of the Vietnam era makes a nice example. But the question remains what the causes of
the difference really were.
With
the data Brooks relays to us, it seems that the only way of explaining the
change is by the subsequent generation’s being inexplicably dumber than its
predecessor had been (not its parents: the only subsequent political Harrimans
that Wikipedia lists exist in science fiction).
Or we might invent some theory of inevitable decline—where the men of
the 1950s were indeed better than those of any other period in recent memory,
but where the law of reversion to the mean shows that all good things must come
to an end, and that they correspondingly did.
What seems certain is that, for Brooks, many other possibilities, though
imaginable, are not likely. The men of
the 1950s did not leave weak or fragile institutions to their successors. The men of the 1950s did not leave nearly
insuperable problems, of their own creation, to those of the 1960s. The men of the 1960s did not do the best they
could under bad circumstances, and certainly did not lay the groundwork for improvement
in the next two or three decades. (Any
of these possibilities would cast in doubt Brooks’ assertion that the 1960s
were a sad falling off from a high place.)
No: what you see is what you get.
What
you see is what you get. Americans were
generally happy in the 1950s, and the presidents of the 1950s were
Republicans. Americans were increasingly
unhappy in the 1960s, and the presidents of that decade were Democrats. In the 1950s there wasn’t yet much in the way
of the social sciences, and bureaucrats could be only generally educated yet
govern with little outside criticism. In
the 1960s many people felt a lot more was known, and at the same time problems
were being identified with increasing frequency. Conservatives like David Brooks are asking
you to do the math. He thinks you’ll be
forced to draw the right conclusion.
Great post, but is this really the case?
I have found that in practice it doesn't always work like that.
Posted by: Acid Reflux Cough | October 23, 2009 at 09:33 AM